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I. INTRODUCTION 
The disparate impact doctrine emerged to more effectively 
remedy the policies and practices that cause or maintain disparities 
based on a protected class—even when the discriminatory intent is 
not explicit. Unlike individual disparate-treatment claims, 
disparate-impact claims more directly address and remedy implicit 
bias and discrimination. Although judicial hostility to robust 
enforcement of civil rights has diluted the power of the disparate 
impact doctrine in recent years, this vital doctrine still offers great 
promise to rectify past and ongoing wrongs. The disparate impact 
doctrine continues to be an essential tool for accomplishing what 
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has eluded the nation to date: wholesale eradication of 
discrimination based on a protected class. 
This article considers the continuing importance of the 
disparate impact doctrine and how it has been severely limited by 
extremist interpretation. In Part II, this article introduces the 
origins of the disparate impact doctrine, highlighting the reasons 
for a progressive application that are as relevant today as when the 
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine fifty years ago.1 Part III 
discusses the politically orchestrated attacks on the disparate 
impact doctrine.2 Part IV analyzes the barriers that judicial activists 
have erected against a meaningful application of the disparate 
impact doctrine.3 Part V discusses recent positive developments in 
the application of the disparate impact doctrine, including the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognizing the existence of, and need to 
remedy, “unconscious prejudice.”4 This article concludes by calling 
for an application of the disparate impact doctrine that returns to 
Congress’s manifest intent when it enacted the nation’s leading 
civil rights statutes and that comports with the Supreme Court’s 
clear precedent when it first adopted the doctrine.5 In this way, the 
American Dream can become a reality for everyone, instead of 
primarily for the privileged. 
II. THE EXPANSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE
ADOPTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE (1960S–1970S) 
A. The Enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, a landmark development in civil 
rights, was enacted to halt the problem of intentional 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and/or national 
origin.6 The Act, which Congress set forth in eleven sections, 
required that voting rights be the same for all people; prevented 
access to public facilities from being denied based on race, 
religion, or national origin; outlawed discrimination in public 
1.  See infra Part II.
2.  See infra Part III.
3.  See infra Part IV.
4.  See infra Section V.A.
5.  See infra Section V.B.
6.  See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE BATTLE TO END 
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 1112 (2014). 
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places; ended segregation in schools; and outlawed discrimination 
by employers and government agencies.7 
Although the Act extended protections to all Americans to 
guard everyone from discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin, the law emerged from the long struggle 
to eliminate discrimination against African Americans, in 
particular. Before President John F. Kennedy proposed the Act to 
Congress, he stated to the American public that “[i]t ought to be 
possible . . . for every American to enjoy the privileges of being 
American without regard to his race or his color” but emphasized 
that this was not yet true because of significant disparities between 
African Americans and whites in educational achievement, 
employment prospects, and life expectancy.8 Although President 
Kennedy focused on equal rights for all citizens, the Act emanated 
directly from “the social impulse toward political, economic, and 
dignitary equality for African Americans,”9 in particular. Moreover, 
Title VII of the Act sought to “eliminate workplace discrimination, 
the basic cause of the disparities that had developed between 
African American and white workers.”10 The history and context of 
Title VII’s passage remind us that, although the law seeks to protect 
all, Congress specifically enacted the law to end discrimination 
against African Americans.11 
7.  See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 431, 432 n.10 (2005). 
8. John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People
on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271. 
9.  See GREGORY, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasis added).
10.  Id. at 10.
11.  Current anti-discrimination law creates additional challenges of
discrimination at the intersection of protected classes. Because Title VII is framed 
to protect individuals from discriminatory employment practices based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin, it essentially forces claimants to “self-
identify using [one of the] established legal categories to situate their claim.” 
Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 
17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 199, 207 (2006). A disparate-impact case that clearly 
exemplifies this problem is DaGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division, 413 F. 
Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 
(8th Cir. 1977). In DaGraffenreid, black female employees brought a claim against 
General Motors under Title VII alleging a seniority system that was discriminatory 
towards black women. Id. at 143. The discrimination the women were facing was 
not simply a matter of their race or a matter of their gender, but rather the 
intersection of both protected classes. Id. The court responded to this claim by 
4
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The legislative history and text of Title VII plainly indicate that 
the law targets explicit discrimination, otherwise known as 
disparate treatment.12 Congress did not, however, expressly codify a 
prohibition against disparate-impact discrimination—that is, 
conduct that appears to be nondiscriminatory but nonetheless has 
a discriminatory effect.13 As written in 1964, Title VII stated in 
section 706(g) that if the “respondent has intentionally engaged in 
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice 
charged in the complaint,” the court “may enjoin the respondent 
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order 
such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”14 Title VII remained 
silent as to whether an employer’s facially neutral policy or practice 
that resulted in a disproportionate effect on a protected class also 
constituted illegal discrimination.15 Title VII’s silence about 
disparate-impact claims left the courts to interpret whether 
Congress intended for plaintiffs to be able to obtain remedies 
concerning “neutral” policies that result in disparities between 
members of protected classes and others. 
saying that the women were “combin[ing] statutory remedies” and as a result 
trying to “create a new ‘super-remedy’ that would give them relief beyond what the 
drafters . . . intended.” Id. The court held that the “lawsuit must be examined to 
see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or 
alternatively either, but not a combination of both.” Id.  
 Although the court ultimately “dismissed the race-based claim, its 
treatment of the sex-based claim illuminate[d] potential intersectional claimants’ 
precarious legal position.” Areheart, supra, at 199200. While General Motors did 
hire white women before Title VII was passed, they did not hire black women until 
after Title VII was passed. Id. at 200. A recession occurred later, and because of the 
seniority system in place at General Motors, “all of the black women were laid off.” 
Id. The court ultimately interpreted these facts as evidence that General Motors 
had hired women, and as a result, there was no sex-based discrimination. Id. Using 
that same analysis, “even if the DaGraffendreid court had heard the race-based claim 
. . . the employer could have disproved it by showing a lack of discrimination 
against black men.” Id. at 200–01. The end result is a “catch-22,” where “black 
women are only protected to the extent that their experiences coincide with those 
of white women or black men.” Id. at 201. 
12.  See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 427–28 (1995). 
13.  Id. at 427 (“[T]he statute does not define the term ‘discrimination’ . . .
[and is therefore] uninformative about the role of discriminatory effects . . . .”). 
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 261 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2016)) (emphasis added). 
15.  See id.
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B. The Affirmation of the Disparate Impact Doctrine Under Title VII: 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact 
doctrine when it interpreted Title VII in the landmark case Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co.16 In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are 
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”17 The Court 
explained that the purpose and intent of Title VII were clear: 
[A]chieve equality of employment opportunities and 
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, 
cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.18 
In other words, the existence of a disparate impact resulting from a 
neutral employment policy or practice is sufficient to establish 
liability under Title VII.19 
Following Griggs, the “[d]isparate impact theory became an 
important tool for addressing more hidden discrimination,” and 
“[a]dministrative agencies and the courts began applying disparate-
impact analysis to other statutes, including Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.”20 For instance, in 
United States v. City of Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit held that a 
zoning ordinance with a racially discriminatory effect violated Title 
VIII, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act.21 
16.  See 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17.  Id. at 431 (“If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is 
prohibited.”) 
18.  Id. at 429–30.
19.  See id.
20.  Kristen Galles, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Civil Rights and Access to
Justice, 41 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. 1, 4 (2015). 
21. 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (“We hold that Zoning Ordinance
No. 12 of the City of Black Jack violates Title VIII, because it denies persons 
housing on the basis of race, in violation of [42 U.S.C. §] 3604(a), and interferes 
with the exercise of the right to equal housing opportunity, in violation of 
[§] 3617.”). 
6
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C. A Progressive Application of the Disparate Impact Doctrine in the 
Wake of Griggs 
Throughout the 1970s, courts consistently and robustly 
interpreted the disparate impact doctrine as set forth in Griggs.22 
Through such precedent, the courts clarified and refined the 
mechanics of applying the doctrine under an array of 
circumstances.23 
The first Supreme Court case addressing the disparate impact 
doctrine after Griggs was Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.24 Albemarle 
clarified the burden-shifting framework for the disparate impact 
doctrine, which Griggs did not directly address.25 Adding the 
burden-shifting framework represented an important development 
because “[t]he order and allocation of the burdens of proof on the 
parties in a civil action . . . governs the fact-finding process and 
factual disputes that lie at the heart of virtually every discrimination 
case”; furthermore, burdens of proof have a “significant effect on 
the outcome of a case and frequently may be dispositive of which 
party wins or loses.”26 
In Albemarle, the Court used the burden-shifting framework 
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green27 for disparate-
treatment cases.28 Under the burden-shifting methodology, the 
plaintiff must first present statistical evidence to demonstrate a 
prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination.29 Once the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
employer to show that the policy or practice in question is “job 
related.”30 Finally, if the employer demonstrates that the policy or 
practice is job-related, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
prove “that the asserted business justification [was] pretext for 
22.  See ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE 
GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER STORY 196 (2014). 
23.  Id.
24. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
25.  See BELTON, supra note 22, at 196.
26.  Id.
27.  See 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
28.  Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
29.  See id. (explaining that a prima facie case of discrimination has been
made when “the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a 
racial pattern significantly different from the pool of applicants”).  
30.  Id.
7
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unlawful discrimination.”31 A plaintiff can show pretext by, inter 
alia, demonstrating the existence of a less-discriminatory 
alternative.32 
Albemarle strengthened the disparate impact doctrine because 
it placed a greater burden of proof on the defendant. Specifically, 
“the burden imposed upon employers under the business necessity 
defense was a substantial one—the burden of persuasion—that was 
difficult to meet in a large number of the disparate-impact cases.”33 
After Albemarle, the disparate impact doctrine continued to 
pick up steam in 1982 when the Supreme Court decided Connecticut 
v. Teal.34 In Teal, the employer defended its procedure for
employee promotions that had a disproportionate impact on 
African Americans.35 The employer argued that its non-job-related 
test for promotions should be allowed because the “bottom-line”36 
result of its “promotional process was an appropriate racial 
balance.”37 The Court rejected the employer’s bottom-line rationale 
in light of Griggs.38 The Court reasoned that “[i]t is clear beyond 
cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal 
opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to 
31.  BELTON, supra note 22, at 197.
32.  See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 436.
33.  BELTON, supra note 22, at 197.
34. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
35.  See id. at 442.
36. “Bottom-line” refers to the type of defense the employer used in this case.
The bottom-line defense focuses on the overall results of a selection procedure 
used by an employer. David N. Yellen, The Bottom Line Defense in Title VII Actions: 
Supreme Court Rejections in Connecticut v. Teal and a Modified Approach, 68 CORNELL 
L. REV. 735, 738 (1983) (“The bottom line defense is applicable when one step in 
a multistep hiring or promotion process has a disparate impact on a protected 
class but the overall process is nondiscriminatory.”). In Teal, the ultimate results of 
the selection procedure used were more favorable to blacks than to whites. See 457 
U.S. at 444 (“The overall result of the selection process was that, of the 48 
identified black candidates who participated in the selection process, 22.9 percent 
were promoted and of the 259 identified white candidates, 13.5 percent were 
promoted.”). The employer argued in Teal that the bottom-line result of its 
promotion policy should be a complete defense to the suit. Id. However, black 
applicants who were disqualified in the first stage were still victims of disparate-
impact discrimination, even though black applicants as a whole did better than 
white applicants. See id. at 456 (“In sum, petitioners’ nondiscriminatory ‘bottom 
line’ is no answer, under the terms of Title VII, to respondents’ prima facie claim 
of employment discrimination.”). 
37.  Teal, 457 U.S. at 442.
38.  See id. at 445–51.
8
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whether members of the applicant’s race are already 
proportionately represented in the work force.”39 In other words, 
the Court determined that attaining a racially balanced work force 
was not a defense to a Title VII violation.  
III. THE RETREAT FROM CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE
DILUTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE (1980S) 
A. The Reagan Administration–Engineered Attack on the Disparate 
Impact Doctrine 
The political—and, thus, judicial—climate that allowed the 
disparate impact doctrine to flourish dramatically changed in the 
1980s: with the election of President Reagan, a concerted and 
expanding attack on the disparate impact doctrine began.40 
“President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 during a time when 
claims of reverse discrimination were on the rise and affirmative 
action was constantly under attack in the political and legal 
arenas.”41 During President Reagan’s eight-year tenure, “his 
administration conducted a sustained political and legal campaign 
to get rid of the disparate impact theory because of the belief that 
the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, which requires 
proof of discriminatory intent, is the only theory of discrimination 
that is embraced in our national commitment to equality.”42 
The Reagan administration wanted to nullify Griggs and 
“engaged in an all-out assault on the disparate impact theory and 
affirmative action.”43 As part of this attack, the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Policy published a report to the Attorney 
General that highlighted the purported absence of intent needed 
39.  Id. at 454–55.
40.  BELTON, supra note 22, at 268 (“President Reagan’s election and his
appointment of conservative Justices to the Supreme Court were among the most 
important developments that set into motion events that eventually led to the 
death of the Griggs disparate impact theory.”).  
41.  Id.
42.  Id. (emphasis added).
43.  Id. at 277–78; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: “DISPARATE 
IMPACT” AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1987) [hereinafter 
DOJ REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION REPORT] (stating in the Executive Summary that 
“if ‘discrimination’ is understood to mean statistically disproportionate effects 
alone, the result will be nothing less than the permanent institutionalization of 
race- and gender-conscious affirmative action”).  
9
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to prevail under the disparate impact doctrine.44 The report stated 
that the only supposedly legitimate concept of discrimination, as 
originally interpreted by Congress, required an element of explicit 
intent or purpose.45 The report concluded, “[t]he redefinition of 
discrimination in civil rights jurisprudence which has been 
underway in this country since the early 1970’s is fraught with 
portentous consequences.”46 The report also condemned the Griggs 
decision, stating that it “marked a tragic turn in American civil 
rights jurisprudence, one away from non-discrimination and toward 
‘an open contest for social and economic benefits conferred on the 
basis of race or other classifications previously thought to be 
invidious.’”47 
In addition to constructing and disseminating the Office of 
Legal Policy report, the Reagan administration shaped disparate-
impact jurisprudence by significantly altering the composition of 
the Supreme Court.48 President Reagan first appointed Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981.49 He then promoted right-wing 
Justice William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and appointed right-wing 
judge Antonin Scalia to Justice Rehnquist’s open seat in 1986.50 
Two years later, Reagan appointed right-leaning Justice Anthony 
Kennedy51 to replace centrist Justice Lewis Powell.52 These 
appointments created a right-wing majority and set the stage for 
the Supreme Court decisions to come, which ultimately dismantled 
Griggs and severely weakened the disparate impact doctrine.53 
44.  See DOJ REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 43.
45.  See id. at 7 (“Discrimination . . . is deemed culpable precisely because it
results from an intent or purpose . . . .”).  
46.  Id. at ii.
47.  Id. at 156 (quoting Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and
Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (1986)). 
48.  George Lovell, Michael McCann & Kirstine Taylor, Covering Legal
Mobilization: A Bottom-Up Analysis of Wards Cove v. Atonio, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 
90 (2016). 
49. William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the Reagan Years
(1980–89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645, 
651 (1994). 
50.  Id.
51.  Id. at 690.
52. Marcy C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme Court’s 1988
Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057, 
1113 n.232 (1990). 
53.  See BELTON, supra note 22, at 268.
10
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B. The Creation of the Federalist Society and the Resulting Intensification 
of the Campaign Against a Progressive Application of the Disparate 
Impact Doctrine 
The establishment of the Federalist Society in the 1980s 
strengthened the Reagan administration’s attack on the disparate 
impact doctrine. The Federalist Society consists largely of right-
wing lawyers, law students, and scholars.54 The organization began 
as a student organization at Yale Law School in 1980 and quickly 
spread to Harvard and the University of Chicago.55 With powerful 
forces supporting the group, the organization became a national 
organization within two years.56 
Soon after the organization’s founding, members of the 
Federalist Society began to enter key positions of leadership within 
the Reagan administration; in fact, the Reagan administration 
actively sought out members of the group to work for the 
administration.57 President Reagan’s Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, Michael Horowitz, “contacted the 
Society’s founding members and began introducing them to key 
people in the Reagan administration.”58 Tellingly, several of the 
founding members59 of the Federalist Society occupied influential 
54.  See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 15 (2007) (discussing the origins of the Federalist Society as a Yale student 
organization that intended to “serve as a platform to discuss and advocate 
conservative ideas in legal thought”).  
55.  See id. The University of Chicago chapter’s “founders ‘questioned the
prevailing notion that big government could solve our country’s social, political, 
and economic problems,’ according to a chapter history. The students teamed 
with conservative professors, including Antonin Scalia, Frank Easterbrook, Richard 
Posner, and Richard Epstein to found the organization.” Meredith Heagney, Law 
School Federalist Society Chapter to Host National Convention, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/law-school-federalist-society-chapter     
-host -national-convention. See generally Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist 
Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary, 62 POL. RES. Q. 366 (2009). 
56.  See generally Scherer & Miller, supra note 55, at 366–78 (discussing the
Federalist Society’s history and analyzing the connection between membership in 
the Federalist Society and political views on the bench). 
57.  See TOOBIN, supra note 54, at 16 (“[T]he Reagan administration began
hiring Federalist members as staffers and, of course, appointing them as judicial 
nominees, with Bork and Scalia as the most famous examples.”).  
58. Scherer & Miller, supra note 55, at 367.
59.  Heagney, supra note 55.
11
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policy-making positions within the Reagan administration’s Justice 
Department.60 
Edwin Meese, a prominent Federalist Society member, served 
as Counselor to the President from 1981 to 1985 and as Attorney 
General from 1985 to 1988.61 In short order, Attorney General 
Meese “began elevating Federalist Society members to positions of 
importance in the Reagan Justice Department,” and “[b]y 1986, all 
12 of the Assistant Attorneys General in the Justice Department 
were tied to the Federalist Society.”62 At one point, “one of the first 
Federalist Society members . . . described the Meese DOJ as a 
‘Federalist Society shop.’”63 
Attorney General Meese presided over the Department of 
Justice precisely when the Office of Legal Policy published the 
report entitled Redefining Discrimination: Disparate Impact and the 
Institutionalization of Affirmative Action, which targeted disparate 
impact doctrine’s purported lack of an intent requirement.64 
Attorney General Meese, however, did not stop there. The 
Department of Justice published numerous reports that “informed 
the legal and constitutional agenda for conservatives inside and 
outside the government . . . .”65 These “reports,” including the one 
criticizing the disparate impact doctrine, reflected the Federalist 
Society’s views. The Federalist Society has continued up to the 
present day with its campaign against the disparate impact 
doctrine.66 
Along with infiltrating the Executive Branch, the Federalist 
Society secured extensive power within the Judicial Branch during 
60.  See Scherer & Miller, supra note 55, at 368.
61.  See id. at 367.
62.  Id.
63.  MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 27
(2013). 
64.  See DOJ REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 43.
65.  Id. at 28.
66.  See generally Carissa Mulder, The Kudzu of Civil Rights Law: Disparate Impact
Spreads Into Educational “Resource Comparability,” 16 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y 
PRAC. GROUPS 7 (2015) (arguing that October 2014 guidance of the U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights encourages disparate treatment in 
the distribution of school resources through misuse of the disparate impact 
doctrine); Roger B. Clegg, OCR’s Testing (Mis)Guidance: Anti-Education, Anti-Civil 
Rights, 3 C.R. PRAC. GROUP NEWSL. 3 (2000) (arguing that the U.S. Department of 
Education, Office of Civil Rights has misappropriated the disparate impact 
doctrine from employment law to standardized tests in higher education). 
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the reign of the Reagan administration. Justice Scalia, appointed by 
President Reagan to the Supreme Court in 1986, was one of the 
original Federalist Society faculty advisors.67 President Reagan also 
appointed Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner to the Seventh 
Circuit; J. Harvie Wilkinson to the Fourth Circuit; Edith Jones to 
the Fifth Circuit; Alex Kozinski to the Ninth Circuit; and Kenneth 
Starr to the D.C. Circuit.68 All of these judges had close ties to the 
Federalist Society.69 
IV. A REGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT
DOCTRINE (1990S–2010S) 
Although President Reagan left office in 1989, the right-wing 
majority he created on the Supreme Court and the growing 
Federalist Society influence over the lower courts escalated the 
hostility toward the disparate impact doctrine. First, in Watson v. 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust70 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,71 the 
Court modified the burden-shifting framework to make it easier for 
employers to defend against disparate-impact claims.72 Second, 
although Congress sought to preserve disparate-impact liability 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the largely toothless remedy 
provided in that Act marked another victory for opponents of the 
disparate impact doctrine.73 Third, as shown in Ricci v. DeStefano,74 
growing tensions between disparate-impact and reverse-
discrimination claims of disparate treatment impeded the ability to 
truly remedy discrimination, especially discrimination resulting 
from implicit bias.75 Fourth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes76 created unnecessary 
and onerous obstacles to the effective prosecution of disparate-
impact claims.77 Each of these hurdles has decreased the viability of 
disparate-impact claims in rectifying institutional discrimination 
against protected classes. Eviscerating the disparate impact 
67.  AVERY & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 21–22.
68.  Id. at 22.
69.  Id.
70. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
71. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
72.  See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998; Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656.
73.  See infra Section IV.C.
74. 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009).
75.  See infra Section IV.D.2.
76. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
77.  See infra Section IV.E.
13
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doctrine in these ways has undermined its capacity to remedy more 
fully the policies and practices that have caused or maintained 
disparities based on a protected class, especially when the 
discriminatory intent is not explicit. 
A. A Harbinger of the Legal Machinations to Come: Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust 
The Supreme Court decided Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust 
in 1988.78 In doing so, it planted the seeds for the ultimate 
dismantling of the disparate impact doctrine as set forth in Griggs.79 
On its face, Watson appeared to strengthen the disparate impact 
doctrine. Prior to Watson, the Court had not spoken as to whether 
the disparate impact doctrine applied in cases where subjective 
criteria80 were used in making employment decisions.81 The 
majority82 in Watson held that employment practices that were 
subjective83 could be analyzed under the disparate impact 
doctrine.84 This was an important development in anti-
78. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
79.  While President Reagan’s election in 1981 has been credited with
beginning the retrenchment of the disparate impact doctrine because of his 
appointment of right-wing Justices to the Supreme Courtwhich ultimately 
resulted in the Wards Cove decision, known as the “civil rights massacre of 
1989”it has also been noted that the Supreme Court began its attack on the 
disparate impact doctrine as early as 1976 when it handed down the decision in 
Washington v. Davis. See BELTON, supra note 22, at 268–70. 
80. “Subjective criteria,” as opposed to “objective criteria,” refers to when an
employer allows a manager to use his discretion to decide, for example, who gets 
hired or fired, or promoted or not promoted. See Anita M. Alessandra, Comment, 
When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1763 (1989). Examples of subjective 
criteria could include an employee’s confidence, friendliness, and attitude. Given 
this subjectivity, managerial decisions could be based on subjective criteria that 
may be the result of hidden biases or personal stereotypes. Id. at 1776. 
81.  Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
82. A majority of the Court, seven members, agreed in Parts I, II-A, II-B, and
III of the opinion that in a Title VII action (1) “disparate impact analysis may be 
applied to . . . subjective or discretionary” employment practices, and (2) certain 
evidentiary standards applied. Id. at 977, 985–86.  
83.  Whereas subjective employment practices leave much discretion to a
manager, objective employment practices limit managerial discretion by basing 
decisions on objective criteria, such as test scores, physical assessments, skills 
measurements, training, education, and experience. Alessandra, supra note 80, at 
1763. 
84.  Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
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discrimination law because plaintiffs can now challenge subjective 
employment practices under the disparate impact doctrine.85 
Watson was a hollow victory for plaintiffs, however, because the 
plurality86 opinion constituted a harbinger for the deleterious 
Wards Cove decision. The plurality “warned that the extension of 
the disparate impact theory had the potential of undermining an 
employer’s freedom to make legitimate business decisions.”87 The 
plurality alleged that broadening the disparate impact doctrine to 
subjective employment decisions may “increase the risk that 
employers will be given incentives to adopt quotas or to engage in 
preferential treatment.”88 Because of this risk, the plurality stated 
that the current burden-shifting framework should be modified to 
“serve as adequate safeguards” to prevent the risk.89 
According to the plurality, a plaintiff must provide statistical 
evidence showing that a specific practice had a disparate impact on 
a protected class to present a prima facie case of disparate impact.90 
Once a plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden of 
production—not the burden of persuasion—shifts to the employer 
to provide legitimate business reasons for the employment 
practice.91 After that, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to assert 
that there is a less discriminatory alternative employment practice 
that can accomplish the employer’s legitimate business goals.92 
The detrimental part of the plurality opinion for the disparate 
impact doctrine lay within the proposed burden-shifting framework 
presented by the Court. “[T]he Court departed from past disparate 
impact cases by affirming that the ultimate burden of proof 
remain[ed], at all times, with the plaintiff.”93 Under this framework, 
85. Merrill D. Feldstein, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust: Reallocating
the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 923 
(1989). 
86.  The plurality opinion comprised Parts II-C and II-D of the opinion.
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices Rehnquist, 
White, and Scalia. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 982. 
87.  Feldstein, supra note 85, at 940.
88.  Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
89.  Id.
90.  Feldstein, supra note 85, at 941.
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the employer never had the burden of persuasion, but merely a 
burden of production.94 
Importantly, the burden-shifting framework conceived in 
Watson would become outcome-determinative for plaintiffs. The 
heavier burden of persuasion required the employer “to prove to 
the fact finder the truth or existence of those facts for which the 
party has the burden.”95 The lighter burden of production merely 
required the employer to “produce evidence” that may or may not 
be convincing.96 When the burden of production shifted to the 
employer to provide a legitimate business reason, the employer 
only needed to produce a reason of some sort; by contrast, the 
burden of persuasion required the employer to prove the truth of 
the reason offered.97 Accordingly, “although allocation of the 
burdens of production and persuasion [was] nominally procedural, 
it ha[d] significant, substantive impact” because “[t]he allocation 
of the burdens between the parties [could] change the outcome of 
the case.”98 Watson foreshadowed the heightened burden plaintiffs 
now face after Wards Cove. 
B. The Purported Death Knell of Griggs: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio 
The disparate impact doctrine sustained a severe blow just one 
year after the Watson decision in 1989 in the form of the Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio decision.99 Because there was no majority 
opinion regarding the reallocation of the burden-shifting 
requirements, the Watson decision created confusion about the 
evidentiary burdens for a disparate-impact case. Wards Cove, 
decided by the Court’s right-wing majority, severely weakened the 
disparate impact doctrine as originally set out in Griggs by adopting 
the new evidentiary approach outlined in Watson.100 
94.  Id.
95.  Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price




98.  Id. at 621.
99.  See 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
 100.  Compare id. at 656–60 (adopting the burden-shifting framework from 
Watson that embraced a lighter burden of production, rather than persuasion), 
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (placing a heavier burden 
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Under Wards Cove, the Court required the plaintiff to identify a 
specific employment practice causing the disparate impact.101 Once 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
burden of production rather than persuasion shifts to the employer to 
articulate a “legitimate business reason” for the practice.102 
Ultimately, the plaintiff must rebut the employer’s legitimate 
business reason by showing that an alternative practice would meet 
the employer’s business reason as well as reduce the disparate 
impact caused by the business practice being challenged.103 
The majority opinion emphasized that requiring an employer 
to meet a higher burden than what Wards Cove created “would 
result in a host of evils.”104 The majority also expressed concern that 
a higher burden for employers would essentially compel the 
adoption of affirmative action.105 One employment law professor 
and commentator explained this concern: “[A]s the defendant’s 
burden of proof becomes heavier, affirmative action becomes less 
and less a voluntary option and more and more a mandatory 
requirement. It becomes the only realistic way of avoiding liability 
under the theory of disparate impact.”106 
The majority’s rationale, the proverbial “parade of horribles,” 
does not turn on rigorous legal analysis or a full and fair 
consideration of the factual reality across the nation. Instead, the 
of persuasion on employers and stating that Congress placed the burden on the 
employer to show that a practice has a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question). 
 101.  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (“As a general matter, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment 
practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.”); see also Kingsley R. 
Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification of Griggs, a Partial 
Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 287, 303 
(1993). 
 102.  Browne, supra note 101, at 303. 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. 
 105.  See id. at 652 (“[A]ny employer who had a segment of his work force that 
was—for some reason—racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and forced 
to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the ‘business 
necessity’ of the methods used to select the other members of his work force. The 
only practicable option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, 
insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial composition from 
the other portions thereof . . . .”)  
 106.  GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 90 (3d ed. 
2010). 
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decision to change the evidentiary standard reflects a political and 
economic judgment that employers and other defendants should 
not be subjected to undue burden and legal exposure. Essentially—
and somewhat arbitrarily—the majority concluded that ensuring 
true equality of opportunity is simply not important enough. Two 
strong dissents to Wards Cove demonstrate this point by criticizing 
the majority’s analysis, or lack thereof. 
First, Justice John Paul Stevens observed that the majority’s 
reliance on the Watson plurality opinion, which commentators have 
criticized because it “relied on no authority whatsoever for its 
proposition,”107 was “most disturbing.”108 Justice Stevens emphasized 
that the divided Wards Cove opinion departed completely from the 
Court’s unanimous decision in Griggs to prohibit neutral 
employment practices with discriminatory effects.109 
In a separate and more pointed dissent, Justice Harry 
Blackmun focused on the stark change in the judicial decision-
making process used by the majority. Legal commentators have 
noted that while the Court “once gave credence to the notion that 
employment inequalities were, at least in part, the product of 
previous racist employment practices” and “once took seriously its 
own charge to eradicate the effects of past discrimination,”110 the 
majority’s opinion did not. For instance, Justice Blackmun 
questioned “whether the majority still believ[ed] that race 
discrimination—or, more accurately, race discrimination against 
nonwhites—[was] a problem in our society, or even remember[ed] 
that it ever was.”111 According to legal commentators, Justice 
Blackmun concluded that the majority chose to “overlook racism” 
and failed “to examine the history of segregation at the cannery in 
Wards Cove.”112 
Not surprisingly, Wards Cove had a drastic effect on the effort 
to remedy discriminatory employment practices. For instance, 
Tyree Scott, a prominent workers’ rights activist, explained in plain 
language the substantial adverse impact that Wards Cove and the 
 107.  Amos N. Jones & D. Alexander Ewing, The Ghost of Wards Cove: The 
Supreme Court, the Bush Administration, and the Ideology Undermining Title VII, 21 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 163, 169 (2005).  
 108.  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109.  Id. at 665–66. 
110.  Jones & Ewing, supra note 107, at 171. 
 111.  Wards Cove, 490 U.S at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
112.  Jones & Ewing, supra note 107, at 170. 
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new burden-shifting framework had on civil rights enforcement 
across the nation: 
The burden was on the employees to prove harm. You 
could allege a prima facie case of discrimination on the 
basis of statistics. And then once you did that, it was on 
the boss to prove that he wasn’t [discriminating]. So it was 
very easy, you know, to start this cause of action, to go into 
court . . . . [W]e had more than two dozen lawsuits filed in 
six or seven cities . . . . And so when the law was good we 
were winning . . . . The Wards Cove case . . . was really the 
death throe to the ‘64 Civil Rights Act in terms of 
employment.113 
In short, Wards Cove represented the culmination of judicial 
extremism, which sought to eliminate the disparate impact 
doctrine in furtherance of business interests. Wards Cove effectively 
rolled back the gains in civil rights achieved through progressive 
application of the disparate impact doctrine in the 1960s and 
1970s. The courts’ subsequent and increasingly regressive approach 
has thwarted application of the doctrine to areas beyond 
employment discrimination. For example, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Alexander v. Sandoval114 has meant that “discrimination 
claims can no longer be pursued under a disparate impact theory 
in cases filed under Title VI, which applies to discrimination claims 
regarding federally funded programs.”115 
C. The Congressional Backlash Against Wards Cove: The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 
In a telling display of the legislative intent behind Title VII, 
Congress responded to the Wards Cove decision with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.116 Congress viewed the Wards Cove decision as 
 113.  Lovell, McCann & Taylor, supra note 48, at 61 (quoting Tyree Scott, a 
workers’ rights activist). 
114.  532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 115.  Justin D. Cummins, The De Facto Death of Disparate Impact in Most Age 
Discrimination Cases, CUMMINS & CUMMINS, LLP (Oct. 29, 2012), 
https://www.cummins-law.com/blog/2012/10/the-defacto-death-of-disparate        
-impact-in-most-age-discrimination-cases/. 
116.  The stated purposes of the amendment were: “(1) to provide appropriate 
remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the 
workplace; (2) to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), 
and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
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undercutting the employment rights Congress sought to protect 
when enacting Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 marked the 
first time Congress expressly codified the disparate impact 
doctrine.117 However, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is often 
heralded as codifying Griggs, it only partially returned the disparate 
impact doctrine to its state pre-Wards Cove. 
Congress, through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, clarified its 
intent by “correcting” the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove 
in several respects. Clarifying the law in several ways, the Act: 
(1) Upheld the Wards Cove decision that plaintiffs must identify 
a specific employment practice creating the disparate 
impact, but provided an exception where if the plaintiff 
could “demonstrate to the court that the elements of a 
respondent’s decisionmaking process [were] not capable 
of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may 
be analyzed as one employment practice;”118 
(2) Required a higher burden of persuasion for an employer 
trying to prove that a disparate impact was the result of a 
“business necessity;”119 
(3) Defined “business necessity” as being “job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business 
necessity,”120 which narrowed judicial discretion to define 
“business necessity”; and 
(4) Changed the Wards Cove requirement that the plaintiff 
establish the presence of a less-discriminatory alternative121 
490 U.S. 642 (1989); (3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory 
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.); and, (4) to respond to recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights 
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)). 
 117.  Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision 
and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 
14–15 (2010). 
118.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).  
 119.  See The Harvard Law Review Ass’n, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The 
Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 896, 913 (1993) (“[T]he defendant-
friendly ‘legitimate business goals’ language in Wards Cove, as well as the broad 
conception of ‘the job in question’ applied in that case . . . ought not be imported 
into the definition of ‘business necessity’ under the Act.”).  
120.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 121.  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661. 
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by requiring the alternative to be “equally” effective as the 
challenged practice.122 
These changes did not usher in an era of more litigation.123 A 
likely explanation is that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for 
compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII claims, “but only 
for claims of intentional discrimination.”124 With only equitable 
remedies available for disparate-impact claims, bringing a case 
remained cost-prohibitive for many plaintiffs because of the 
challenging burden-shifting framework from Wards Cove and the 
minimal monetary incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue 
disparate-impact claims.125 Without either a private attorney general 
provision, providing sufficient capacity for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
bring suit, or the availability of punitive damages to compel 
accountability, the Act did not provide a viable means of 
enforcement. 
Despite often being hailed as an affirmation of Griggs, the 
reality remains that many elements of Wards Cove have remained 
intact after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. As a result, “it is 
not at all clear that the disparate-impact provisions of the 1991 Act 
have delivered their promised victory.”126 Notwithstanding the 
monetary issue of remedies, plaintiffs bringing disparate impact 
claims post–Civil Rights Act of 1991 must identify a specific 
employment practice in order to establish a prima facie disparate-
impact case.127 This new requirement has proven fatal to many 
claims. In Clark v. Eagle Food Centers, for example, an employee 
alleged that her employer’s promotion practices had a disparate 
impact on women and had statistical evidence to support a 
 122.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). This change allowed the employee to 
rebut the employer’s showing of business necessity and job relatedness by showing 
that (1) an alternative practice exists that produces less of a disparate impact and 
(2) the employer refuses to adopt that alternative employment practice. See 
Browne, supra note 101, at 371–72. 
 123.  See Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Built-in 
Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 271 (2011) (“[T]here 
was no surge in the number of disparate impact suits filed after 1991.”). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. However, it has also been suggested that the reduction in disparate-
impact cases after 1991 is because the disparate impact doctrine was effective in 
fulfilling its purpose of “encourag[ing] employers to develop internal practices 
that did not have a disparate impact on protected classes.” Id. 
 126.  Id. at 261. 
 127.  Id. at 267. 
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disparate-impact claim, but the court still dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claim because she could not isolate to the court’s satisfaction the 
specific practice creating the disparate impact.128 
D. The Manufactured Tension Between the Disparate Impact and 
Disparate Treatment Theories of Liability 
1. Pitting the Disparate Impact Theory Against the Disparate
Treatment Theory: Ricci v. DeStefano
The regressive attack on the disparate impact doctrine reached 
new heights in 2009 when the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. 
DeStefano.129 This case most clearly exemplifies the judicial activism 
of the Court’s right-wing majority. Although Ricci concerned 
disparate treatment, the majority reached beyond to decide 
questions about the constitutionality of the disparate impact 
doctrine.130 Indeed, the majority used Ricci to exploit the supposed 
tension between the disparate impact and disparate treatment 
theories as a rationale for further attacking the disparate impact 
doctrine.131 
The facts of Ricci involved a promotion examination in the City 
of New Haven.132 The results of the examination showed a disparate 
impact on candidates of color.133 The City decided not to use the 
results of the promotion examination to avoid Title VII liability 
under the disparate impact doctrine.134 The Supreme Court held, 
 128.  Clark v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 95-3459, 1997 WL 6145, at *1 (8th 
Cir. Jan. 9, 1997) (“Clark did not identify a specific employment practice that 
caused this statistical disparity; rather, she simply restated her disparate treatment 
allegations that Eagle pursued intentionally discriminatory policies against women 
in training and promotion opportunities.”). 
129.  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 130.  Id. at 584. 
 131.  Id. at 558 (“The question, therefore, is whether the purpose to avoid 
disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-
treatment discrimination.”). Interpreting these doctrines in opposition to each 
other is troubling for the future of the disparate impact doctrine because it 
circumvents the purpose and policy behind Title VII and the disparate impact 
doctrine by dissuading employers from taking necessary preventative measures to 
eradicate systemic discrimination and makes it impossible for the disparate impact 
doctrine to operate as it was intended. 
 132.  Id. at 557. 
 133.  Id. at 562. 
 134.  Id.  
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however, that the City of New Haven intentionally discriminated 
against the white firefighters when it decided not to use the results 
of the promotion examination, given the disparate impact of using 
those results.135 In its analysis, the majority considered whether the 
City met its burden in proving that preventing disparate impact on 
candidates of color was an adequate defense for “intentional 
discrimination.”136 
To determine whether the City met its burden, the Court first 
had to decide what evidentiary standard applied. The majority 
relied on Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education137 and applied 
Wygant’s “strong-basis-in-evidence-standard.”138 The Ricci court held 
that the City did not have a strong basis in evidence to conclude 
that the promotional examination was ineffective or, furthermore, 
to abandon the test scores in avoidance of disparate-impact 
liability.139 
The majority held that a prima facie showing of a statistical 
disparity was not enough to demonstrate the City would be liable 
for disparate impact.140 It determined that “before an employer can 
engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of 
avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the 
employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be 
subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-
conscious, discriminatory action.”141 The majority emphasized that 
the City could only be liable for disparate impact if (1) the City 
could not show that its examinations were job-related and 
consistent with a business necessity, or (2) the City could not 
overcome less-discriminatory alternatives available to the City to 
meet its objective.142 Because the City did not meet this threshold, 
 135.  Id. at 563. 
 136.  Id. at 579. 
137.  476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 138.  Id. at 277–78 (“The trial court must make a factual determination that 
the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action 
was necessary. The ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate 
the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program. But unless such a 
determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge by nonminority 
employees to remedial action cannot determine whether the race-based action is 
justified as a remedy for prior discrimination.”). 
139.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009). 
 140.  Id. at 587. 
 141.  Id. at 585. 
 142.  Id. at 587. 
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the majority held that preventing disparate-impact liability in this 
case did not defeat the disparate-treatment claims. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia signaled the imminent 
escalation of the attack on the disparate impact doctrine. Justice 
Scalia declared as follows: “The Court’s resolution of these cases 
makes it unnecessary to resolve these matters today. But the war 
between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged 
sooner or later.”143 
2. The Problem of Implicit Bias and Unconscious Discrimination
After Ricci
As overt discrimination has become less prevalent in the 
workplace, the spotlight on unconscious discrimination or implicit 
bias, “characterized by a subconscious decisionmaking process 
based on intuition and a lack of an overt intent to discriminate,” 
has become more prominent.144 What social scientists have deemed 
“implicit bias” has drawn great attention to how people look at 
discrimination in modern times.145 “Implicit biases are defined as 
the subconscious attitudes, feelings, and stereotypes that an 
individual may possess toward a given social group,”146 which are 
“assimilated through interactions with others and an individual’s 
culture, and are picked up throughout an individual’s lifetime.”147 
However, “most individuals are entirely unaware that they possess 
any implicit biases.”148 
Implicit bias is a growing concern in the employment context 
in particular. The “workplace has shifted away from the rigid and 
linear systems of the past, which has enhanced the impact of 
implicit biases on the employment decisionmaking process.”149 
Moreover, modern workplaces tend to require individuals to “make 
quick decisions that are largely based on intuition” and require 
employers to “rely on subjective characteristics to evaluate their 
employees.”150 Where much discretion is given to an employer, an 
 143.  Id. at 595–96. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Christopher Cerullo, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias 
and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 127 (2013). 
 146.  Id. at 138. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 139. 
 150.  Id. at 140. 
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employee becomes more vulnerable to the deleterious effect of 
implicit bias, which may lead to unconscious discrimination.151 
Although such discrimination may be unintentional, the result 
would be effectively the same as explicitly intentional 
discrimination.152 In other words, implicit bias can lead to a 
disparate impact. 
In this context, the question becomes whether an employer 
can acknowledge implicit bias and remedy systemically 
discriminatory practices without disparate treatment—that is, 
without engaging in intentional discrimination. The majority in 
Ricci created a false choice between rectifying institutional 
discrimination and avoiding disparate treatment.153 In truth, the 
purported victims of supposed disparate treatment are 
beneficiaries of systemic discrimination in their favor, so the 
disparate impact doctrine acts as a corrective mechanism to make 
the playing field more level for everyone. Application of the 
disparate impact doctrine, then, remedies rather than perpetuates 
discrimination. 
In sum, a systemic approach that considers outcomes of 
policies and practices—regardless of how well-intentioned the 
policies and practices may be—is necessary to achieve the equality 
of opportunity that the legislative branch has recognized to be 
axiomatic. “Congress . . . cast the [employment and civil rights] 
plaintiff in the role of a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a 
policy ‘of the highest priority.’”154 Similarly, the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act declares that “discrimination threatens the rights and 
privileges of the inhabitants of this state and menaces the 
institutions and foundations of democracy.”155 In light of the 
institutional nature of discrimination and the reality of implicit bias 
in decision-making, the disparate impact doctrine remains essential 
to eradicating discrimination based on a protected class as both 
Congress and the Supreme Court have previously mandated. 
 151.  Id. at 158. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 629 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
 154.  N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17 
(1978)). 
 155.  MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subdiv. 1(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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E. The Core Impediments to Class Action Certification of Disparate-
Impact Claims 
1. The Practical Nexus Between Disparate-Impact Claims and Class
Actions
Class actions facilitate more robust enforcement activity 
regarding systemic violations because they enable plaintiffs to pool 
resources and shared experience in prosecuting civil rights 
claims.156 Because class actions allow the financial burden of 
attorney’s fees and litigation costs to be divided amongst a larger 
number of claimants, it is “economically possible to assert 
[claims].”157 As a result, class actions work to “eliminate power 
imbalances” that exist between individual plaintiffs and large 
corporate defendants.158 
In addition to equalizing the differences in resources between 
parties, class actions help to equalize the comparative power in 
litigation because an individual plaintiff may have substantial 
“emotional apprehension” and “fear of retaliation by an employer” 
if proceeding by himself or herself.159 In other words, class actions 
operate to provide strength in numbers, which helps to “motivate 
and inspire confidence in individual class members.”160 
Because discrimination takes its toll on a particular group 
based on a particular characteristic, it makes sense that group-
based litigation strategies should be used. Indeed, by its very 
nature, “[e]vidence of disproportionate impact inevitably is 
evidence that an entire class has suffered from a violation of Title 
VII.”161 Furthermore, the word “discrimination” connotes group-
based action; specifically, it can be described as “the practice of 
 156.  97 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 81 Litigating an Employment Discrimination 
Class Action § 5 (2007). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the 
Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 755, 790 (2008). 
159.  Sherry E. Clegg, Employment Discrimination Class Actions: Why Plaintiffs 
Must Cover All Their Bases After the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2012). 
 160.  Id. at 1095. 
 161.  George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 712–13 
(1980). 
26
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/3
  
128 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
unfairly treating a person or group of people differently from other 
people or groups of people.”162 
Courts have also pointed to the practical nexus between 
disparate impact and class actions pre- and post-Griggs. In 1960—
before Griggs—the Seventh Circuit held in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive 
Co. that a “suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class action 
as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a 
class characteristic, i.e. race, sex, religion or national origin.”163 
Moreover, in 1982—after Griggs—the United States Supreme Court 
reasoned that it “[could not] disagree with the proposition 
underlying the across-the-board rule—that racial discrimination is 
by definition class discrimination.”164 
Consequently, employment discrimination cases pursued via 
the disparate impact doctrine are generally class actions,165 and they 
are most successful as such.166 While individuals can pursue 
disparate-impact claims, they are often unsuccessful.167 These claims 
are difficult for individual plaintiffs because of the “evidentiary 
rigors of a disparate-impact claim, consisting of aggregate statistics 
showing that an employer’s facially neutral practice had a 
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group.”168 
Producing necessary statistics is a lengthy process requiring 
“extensive discovery and expert testimony, which individual 
plaintiffs commonly fail to do.”169 
 162.  Discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/discrimination (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (defining discrimination as 
“the practice of unfairly treating a person or group of people differently from 
other people or groups of people”). 
163.  Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969). 
164.  Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). 
165.  James S. Bryan, Shifting the Burdens in Disparate Impact Cases: Wards Cove 
Packing v. Atonio, 6 LAB. LAW. 233, 235 (1990). 
 166.  See Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L. J. 433, 443 (2012). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 444. 
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2. The Culmination of the Ideologically Driven Attack on the
Disparate Impact Doctrine and Class Actions: Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes
Despite the practical nexus between disparate-impact claims 
and class action claims, the recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, a massive class action involving over 1.5 million plaintiffs,
created new hurdles for those seeking to eradicate 
discrimination.170 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 
plaintiffs must satisfy four prerequisites before a class may be 
certified171: “numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy.”172 
The issue in Wal-Mart involved the commonality requirement.173 
Prior to Wal-Mart, the commonality requirement had “been seen as 
relatively easy to satisfy” and required simply that “each member of 
the class assert claims that share[d] legal or factual issues with one 
another.”174 
In Wal-Mart, however, the majority required a heightened 
commonality standard. Under Wal-Mart, members of a class have to 
“suffer[] the same injury,” not just “a violation of the same 
provision of law.”175 To support this heightened standard, the 
majority argued that Wal-Mart’s policy of delegating pay and 
promotion decisions to local manager discretion based on 
subjective factors was not sufficient to meet the commonality 
requirement under Rule 23.176 The majority declared that “the 
mere claim by employees of the same company that they have Title 
VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no 
cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at 
once.”177 Instead, the majority held the following: 
 170.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
 171.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“Prerequisites. One or more members of a class 
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) 
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”). 
 172.  Tippett, supra note 166, at 444.  
 173.  See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349 (“The crux of this case is commonality.”). 
174.  A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining 
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 443 (2013). 
 175.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. 
 176.  See id. at 352. 
 177.  Id. at 350. 
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[The plaintiffs’ claims] must depend upon a common 
contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory 
bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common 
contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is 
capable of classwide resolution—which means that 
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue 
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in 
one stroke.178 
Not surprisingly, under this onerous new standard, the 
majority found that the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart failed to show they 
had sufficient commonality to certify a class.179 Otherwise stated, 
Wal-Mart “raise[d] the bar for plaintiffs seeking to certify large class 
actions involving disparately situated individuals and provide[d] 
class-action defendants with a variety of tools to defeat such 
efforts.”180 
The majority opinion in Wal-Mart represents yet another 
setback for the disparate impact doctrine, in particular, and civil 
rights enforcement, in general. The disparate impact doctrine, 
especially when used in the prosecution of class actions, is 
potentially one of the most powerful means of challenging 
corporate power that perpetuates—and even profits from—
discrimination-induced inequality. In particular, class-based 
discovery and the fee-shifting mechanism under civil rights statutes 
collectively enable the proverbial David to have a chance at 
prevailing over the proverbial Goliath. Wal-Mart undermines the 
ability of future litigants to use collective action to challenge 
discriminatory practices for protected classes in this manner. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 359.  
 180.  Grace E. Speights & Paul C. Evans, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Supreme Court 
Announces Stricter Class-Certification Standards, WESTLAW J. EXPERT SCI. EVIDENCE, 
Dec. 20, 2011, at 12, 2011 WL 6367678, at *1; see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360 
(holding unanimously that claims for monetary relief may not be certified as a 
class action under Rule 23(b)(2)); see also Speights & Evans, supra, at *3 (“This 
ruling has widespread implications for class actions because Rule 23(b)(3) 
requires plaintiffs to prove that common questions predominate over individual 
ones and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Given the court’s cynicism regarding the 
use of discretionary decision making as grounds for the less-stringent commonality 
standard, this burden should be extremely difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to meet 
in employment class actions without significantly altering the types of class actions 
they bring.”). 
29
Cummins and Belle Isle: Toward Systemic Equality: Reinvigorating a Progressive Applicatio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
2017] TOWARD SYSTEMIC EQUALITY 131 
Wal-Mart, like Wards Cove, reflects political and economic 
judgments—shaped primarily by the ideologically-driven Federalist 
Society—regarding what is “best,” rather than a principled analysis 
of how to apply the compelling public policy codified by the 
governing civil rights statutes. In other words, the majority in Wal-
Mart placed corporate interests before the public interest—
prioritizing the preservation of company profits over fulfilment of 
the constitutional promise of equality for all.181 
F. The Obvious Consequence of a Regressive Application of the Disparate 
Impact Doctrine: Continued Disparities Based on a Protected Class 
Beginning in the 1980s, largely ideologically-driven courts 
began to distort the disparate impact doctrine adopted in Griggs. 
Recent applications of the disparate impact doctrine deviated 
radically from Griggs, which sought to establish a viable claim for 
“practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”182 
Whereas the Supreme Court in Albemarle operationalized the 
doctrine by placing a greater burden of proof on the defendant, 
 181.  Wal-Mart espouses the same prioritization of corporate interests over the 
public interest illustrated by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). Both Citizens United and the follow-up McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), collectively stand for the proposition that 
corporations and billionaires should be allowed to inject as much money into the 
electoral process as they want because that somehow constitutes “free speech” and 
promotes democracy. The practical reality, of course, is that the speech of 
corporations and billionaires drowns out the speech of regular people. The de 
facto quid pro quo of massive campaign contributions for policy changes 
undermines democracy. 
Although many declare that the United States is a democracy, a recent 
empirical study by Princeton economists determined that our form of government 
is actually most like an oligarchy. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing 
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 
PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 564, 577 (2014) (“Americans do enjoy many features central 
to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and 
association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if 
policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small 
number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic 
society are seriously threatened.”). An oligarchy is characterized by a “small group 
of people” or interests that control a country. Oligarchy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligarchy (last visited Sept. 22, 
2016). 
182.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
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rather than on the plaintiff,183 the Court, channeling the Federalist 
Society agenda, has since perverted the doctrine’s purpose of 
eliminating discrimination against protected classes, whether the 
discrimination was intentional or not. 
Just as Wards Cove, Ricci, and Wal-Mart have seriously limited 
the power of disparate-impact claims under Title VII, the Supreme 
Court has used other decisions to restrict or even eliminate 
disparate-impact claims under other civil rights statutes. Sandoval, 
discussed above, actually nullified the disparate impact doctrine 
under Title VI regarding federally funded programs.184 The 
Supreme Court limited disparate impact’s viability under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) in a 2005 decision, 
Smith v. City of Jackson.185 
In Smith, the Court recognized disparate impact as a 
cognizable claim under the ADEA.186 In doing so, the Court 
recognized similarities between the ADEA and Title VII. The Court 
noted that the Griggs court “interpreted the identical text at 
issue”187 in Smith and, thus, “[t]he language and circumstances 
surrounding the passage of both Acts indicated that they should be 
interpreted similarly.”188 
Nonetheless, the majority in Smith departed from Griggs by 
applying a diluted version of the disparate impact doctrine for 
ADEA claims.189 In Griggs, the Court held that a practice resulting in 
 183.  See BELTON, supra note 22, at 196–97. 
 184.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
 185.  See 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005). 
 186.  See id. at 239. The ADEA was passed in 1967 and its intended purposes 
were “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than 
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help 
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).  
 187.  Smith, 544 U.S. at 236. 
 188.  Debra Burke, ADEA Disparate Impact Discrimination: A Pyrrhic Victory?, 9 
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 47, 57 (2008). 
189.  It is worth noting that the Court revisited its Smith holding in Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in 2008. See 554 U.S. 84, 95 (2008). The Smith case 
left it unclear whether the burden for showing an RFOA (reasonable factor other 
than age) rested with the employee or the employer. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 228. 
The Meacham Court held “an employer facing a disparate-impact claim and 
planning to defend on the basis of RFOA must not only produce evidence raising 
the defense, but also persuade the factfinder of its merit.” 554 U.S. at 87; see Burke, 
supra note 188, at 75. Despite doing so, “the Court recognized that the difference 
in the burden of proof applied to the facts may not translate into a difference in 
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a disparate impact violates the law unless the employer can show 
the practice is related to job performance. Griggs emphasized that 
“[t]he touchstone is business necessity.”190 The majority in Smith 
held, however, that the employer can rebut the prima facie case of 
disparate impact for older workers “if it can establish that the policy 
is based upon a reasonable factor other than age—a rather 
undemanding burden.”191 The majority also concluded that the 
RFOA (reasonable factor other than age) showing only requires 
the employer to “meet a reasonableness test; there is no inquiry 
concerning whether there is a better way to achieve a goal,” which 
is “an inquiry required under business necessity.”192 The result for 
plaintiffs is “a difficult, if not impossible, burden of proof,”193 
because they have to prove that the “employer’s proffered 
rationalization of the allegedly discriminatory practice or policy is 
unreasonable, either in the prima facie case or in rebuttal to an 
affirmative defense.”194 In effect, Smith allows employers to 
“promulgate whatever policy they choose, providing it makes some 
degree of sense, notwithstanding its impact on protected 
employees,” and represents another example of how the Court has 
skewed disparate impact doctrine analysis.195 Rather than seeking to 
prevent discrimination against protected classes, regressive 
application of the doctrine protects business interests and props up 
the powerful at the expense of equal opportunity and the public 
interest. 
The seemingly abstract issues about burdens of proof have 
concrete consequences. Statistics reflect ongoing and intensifying 
disparities in the context of the anemic application of the disparate 
impact doctrine.196 A recent study found that it would take 228 
years to close the wealth gap between African American and white 
the result.” Burke, supra note 188, at 76. 
190.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 191.  Burke, supra note 188, at 59–60. 
192.  Ann Marie Tracey & Norma Skoog, Is Business Judgment a Catch-22 for 
ADEA Plaintiffs? The Impact of Smith v. City of Jackson on Future ADEA Employment 
Litigation, 33 DAYTON L. REV. 231, 255 (2008). 
 193.  Burke, supra note 188, at 69–70. 
 194.  Id. at 70. 
 195.  Id. at 82. 
 196.  See, e.g., Kate Davidson, It Would Take 228 Years for Black Families to Amass 
Wealth of White Families, Analysis Says, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2016, 7:12 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/08/09/it-would-take-228-years-for-black     
-families-to-amass-wealth-of-white-families-analysis-says/.  
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families.197 Also, by way of example, “only 24 percent of CEOs in the 
US were women and they earned 74.5 percent as much as male 
CEOs.”198 The statistics illustrate that disparities reach far beyond 
employment access and into educational access,199 heath care 
access,200 access to quality and affordable housing,201 and financial 
access for economic security.202 
The widespread presence of these disparities within a large 
number of systems of opportunity demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of unconscious and institutionalized discrimination, which requires 
a systematic approach to fully remedy past and ongoing harm. The 
disparate treatment theory, which relies on the evidence of overt 
discrimination to prove explicit intent, is not an effective tool for 
addressing the persistent and intensifying disparities experienced 
by members of protected classes. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Gender Inequality and Women in the U.S. Labor Force, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/gender-equality-in-the-workplace/WCMS 
_159496/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (describing the ongoing 
presence of gender pay gaps and disparities in the number of women in 
leadership positions in corporations).  
 199.  Saeed Ahmed, Racial Disparities Persist in U.S. Schools, Study Finds, CNN
(June 27, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/07/health/schools-disparity          
-education-study/ (indicating ongoing racial disparities in education). 
 200.  AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., 2014 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT 2 (May 2015), 
https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/research/findings/nhqrdr 
/nhqdr14/2014nhqdr.pdf (indicating research suggests disparities in healthcare 
access). 
 201.  Gregory D. Squires & Charis E. Kubrin, Privileged Places: Race, Opportunity 
and Uneven Development in Urban America, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (Fall 2006), 
http://nhi.org/online/issues/147/privilegedplaces.html (“Seventy percent of 
white families own their homes; approximately half of black families do so. For 
blacks, home equity accounts for two-thirds of their assets compared with two-fifths 
for whites. A study of the 100 largest metropolitan areas found that black 
homeowners received 18 percent less value for their investments in their homes 
than white homeowners.”). 
 202.  For example, “[i]n the Milwaukee metropolitan area, while African-
Americans represent 16% of the population they only received 4% of mortgage 
loans. Similarly, African-Americans make up 18% of the population in the St. 
Louis metropolitan area but only had 4% of all home loans made there.” Jacob 
Passy, Racial Disparities Seen in Loan Data for Three MSAs: Report, NAT’L MORTGAGE 
NEWS (July 20, 2016), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination 
/racial-disparities-seen-in-loan-data-for-three-msas-report-1082644-1.html.  
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Recent movements, such as Occupy Wall Street and Black 
Lives Matter, demonstrate an increasing recognition that the 
system needs to be changed because it disadvantages members of 
protected classes as a matter of course, if not by design. “Occupy’s 
fundamental message—that the financial and political systems is 
rigged in favor of the 1%—has gained ground over the past five 
years.”203 Likewise, the Black Lives Matter movement has raised 
awareness about discriminatory legal systems.204 Robust 
enforcement of civil rights statutes via a meaningful and 
progressive application of the disparate impact doctrine is crucial 
to avert the potential political, social, and economic repercussions 
that evidently will flow from refusal to change the status quo in 
furtherance of equalizing opportunity. 
V. ENVISIONING A MORE MEANINGFUL APPLICATION OF THE 
DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE 
Although much of the jurisprudence concerning the disparate 
impact doctrine has developed under Title VII to address 
workplace discrimination, the doctrine has also been used under 
Title VIII to address housing discrimination.205 In 2015, the 
Supreme Court revisited the disparate impact doctrine under Title 
VIII in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc.206 in a manner that offers hope for the 
future. 
A. The Explicit Recognition of the Need to Remedy “Unconscious 
Prejudice”: Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. 
Against the trend of applying the disparate impact doctrine in 
a regressive way, the Supreme Court embraced an expansive 
interpretation of the doctrine in Inclusive Communities. Specifically, 
the Court recognized that disparate impact is a cognizable claim 
 203.  Ben Geier, The Occupy Movement Comes of Age, FORTUNE (May 24, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/24/the-occupy-movement-comes-of-age/. 
 204.  See, e.g., Robert King, Black Lives Matter Holds White House Protest, WASH. 
EXAMINER (July 8, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/black-lives-matter 
-holds-white-house-protest/article/2596042 (discussing legal discrimination).  
 205.  See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 206.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
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under Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).207 In doing so, the 
Court analyzed Title VII and the ADEA, the two anti-discrimination 
statutes that preceded the FHA.208 The Court decided that the logic 
of Griggs and Smith provided “strong support for the conclusion 
that the FHA [supports] disparate-impact claims.”209 This 
conclusion, paired with statutory analysis of the results-oriented 
policies of the FHA, prompted the Court formally to adopt the 
disparate impact doctrine under the FHA.210 
Importantly, the language of the Court’s decision in Inclusive 
Communities suggests a shift in how the Court views the disparate 
impact doctrine. The author of the decision, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, concluded by writing that the Court “acknowledges the 
Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in moving the nation toward a 
more integrated society.”211 Justice Kennedy’s language further 
embraced the insight and reasoning of Griggs when he wrote the 
following vital words: “Recognition of disparate-impact liability 
under the FHA plays an important role in uncovering 
discriminatory intent: it permits plaintiffs to counteract 
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy 
classification as disparate treatment.”212 Given the Court’s 
acknowledgement of “unconscious prejudices” leading to disparate 
impacts,213 Inclusive Communities marks a crucial return to a 
progressive application of the disparate impact doctrine. 
 207.  See id. at 2525. 
 208.  See id. at 2516–18. 
 209.  Id. at 2518. 
 210.  See Justin D. Cummins, Fair Housing Protections Remain Robust, CUMMINS & 
CUMMINS, LLP (July 2, 2015), https://www.cummins-law.com/blog/2015/07/fair 
-housing-protections-remain-robust/ (Congress “enacted the Fair Housing Act 
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which abolished 
slavery,” and its passage sought to achieve a more integrated society that departed 
from the segregation of housing, which “means the segregation of schools and 
other institutions . . . all of which [are] vestige[s] of slavery according to 
Congress.”). 
 211.  Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525–26. 
 212.  Id. at 2511–12. 
 213.  Id. 
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B. The Mandate for a Systematic Approach to Remedy Continuing 
Disparities: A Return to a Progressive Application of the Disparate 
Impact Doctrine 
For the disparate impact doctrine to be meaningful and for 
the nation to have any chance of truly eliminating discrimination, 
courts should do the following to restore analytical integrity to the 
legal regime: (1) re-impose a burden of persuasion, rather than 
merely a burden of production, on defendants before they can shift 
the evidentiary burden back to plaintiffs in disparate-impact cases; 
(2) make explicit the fee-shifting mechanism that enables plaintiffs’ 
counsel to serve as private attorneys general in disparate-impact 
claims; (3) certify class actions in disparate-impact cases; and (4) 
reject defendants’ efforts to pit disparate impact against disparate 
treatment theories of liability. 
In addition to restoring vitality to the disparate impact 
doctrine that existed in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts should 
draw upon more recent insights to make the doctrine as relevant 
and effective as possible in the twenty-first century. In particular, 
courts would do well to consider evidence of both disproportionate 
advantage and disproportionate disadvantage as proof of a 
disparate-impact claim.214 In other words, and given the subtle 
forms that discrimination often takes now, courts need to look at 
both sides of the equation for evidence of a civil rights violation. 
Reframing the disparate impact doctrine to provide not only a 
remedy for subordination, but also a remedy for privilege, “would 
empower courts to identify and remedy . . . more discrimination 
because . . . discrimination can manifest itself as either privilege or 
subordination, not just subordination.”215 To exemplify this idea, 
consider the following: “[I]f whites receive benefits—jobs, 
promotions, contracts, housing opportunities, or loans—to an 
extent substantially exceeding their numbers within the pool of 
prospective recipients or applicants, people of color would have the 
evidentiary basis for a cause of action.”216 
 214.  See Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate Treatment and Disparate 
Impact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 HOW. L.J. 455, 477 (1998) (“Not only 
does anti-discrimination law fail to remedy adequately racial subordination, it also 
completely ignores . . . privilege, all in the quest to preserve formal equality. 
Consequently, anti-discrimination law, as dictated by the current disparate 
treatment and disparate impact doctrines, preserves the . . . status quo.”). 
 215.  Id. at 476.  
 216.  Id. at 472–73. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, challenging discriminatory practices under a 
disparate treatment theory of liability has not even come close to 
eliminating discrimination in the United States. In the employment 
arena and elsewhere, courts effectively enabled companies and 
other defendants to explain away discriminatory practices by 
alleging that there was no intent to discriminate,217 even as the 
disparities based on a protected class widened.218 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact 
doctrine to hold businesses and other defendants accountable for 
facially neutral practices that privilege one group of employees at 
the expense of members of a protected class.219 A progressive 
application of the disparate impact doctrine yielded highly positive 
results around the country until the 1980s, when political change 
empowered right-wing legal activists and judges to impose a 
regressive application of the doctrine.220 Since then, the disparities 
based on protected classes have increased substantially and 
unsurprisingly.221 
The growing awareness of implicit bias offers great promise, 
even as the efforts to dismantle the disparate impact doctrine have 
continued. During its last term, the Supreme Court expressly 
acknowledged the existence of, and the need to remedy, 
unconscious discrimination in the context of emphasizing the 
disparate impact doctrine’s value.222 At a more practical level, the 
enhanced understanding of implicit bias has prompted corporate 
leaders, such as Facebook, Coca-Cola, and Google, and government 
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide 
implicit bias trainings while addressing unconscious discrimination 
within their institutions.223 
These important developments signal the return to a 
progressive application of the disparate impact doctrine. To that 
 217.  See supra Section IV.B. 
 218.  See supra Section IV.F. 
 219.  See supra Section II.B. 
 220.  See supra Part III. 
 221.  See supra Section IV.F. 
 222.  See supra Section V.A. 
 223.  See Valentina Zarya, I Failed This Test on Racism and Sexism—and So Will 
You, FORTUNE (Nov. 10, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/10/test-racism          
-sexism-unconscious-bias/ (discussing the increasing organizational use of 
unconscious bias training as a response to implicit bias).  
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end, courts should follow the recommendations set forth above in 
Section V.B. In so doing, the judiciary can help fulfill the 
constitutional promise of equal opportunity for all. Such an 
approach will not only promote the rule of law, it will also help to 
“form a more perfect Union.”224 
 224.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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